On Jun e 17, 1981, the Supreme Courl, in a 5 -3 dec ision, held tl1at the heallh of workers sllOuld ou tweigh "nil other considerations" in reg ulntiotls implemwting the Occ upational . would be itl cotlsistetll wilh the la w, the majorily opinion sa id. This decision ins istslhat market outcomes and econom ic analyses should not determ ine the goals and values regula/ or y agetldes seek to achieve. This runs counter to efforts of O;e Reagan administration to bnse regulatory policy on economic techniques of cost-benefit analysis.
Reagan ha s ordered a ll federal agencies to refrain from major reg ulatory action "unless th e potentia l ben efits to society from th e regu lation outweig h th e costs. " Executive Order 12291, publi shed in th e Federal Regisler on February 10, ma y help to reform the nation's cumbersome regu latory process. Its critics contend, however, that it will add only anot her la yer to mounting bureaucratic paperwork.
Who is rig ht? Does cos t-benefit ana lys is offe r a ne utra l and rationa l approach to sound regulatory policy ? Will it bia s or delay hard choices instead?
Economi st s in the 1940s and 50s, who developed cos t-benefit analysis, did so to apply the theory of th e firm to the governme nt. They thou g ht that public investments s hould return a profit to society as a w hole . These economists compared the market va lu e of irrigation and hydroelectric powe r, for example, wit h the capital costs of building dams. The Flood The New Yorker Magazine, Inc .
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Control Act of 1939 in sisted upon this weigh ing of economic pluses and minuses. It permitted the government to finance water projects on ly when " the benefits to w homsoe ver the y accrue [are} in excess of the costs." The environmental and civil rights legislation of the 1960s and 70s dramatically c h a· nged thi s situat ion . Congress passed these laws-as it had earlier approved child labor legislation-for poli t ical or ethica l rather than for primarily economic reasons. Even if child labor were profitable for society as a whole we may sti ll want to outlaw it. Sim ilarl y, the Clean Air and Clean Water Ac t s were passed to improve air and water quality and not necessarily to achieve economica ll y "optimal" levels of pollution. We may insist upon a cleaner env ironme nt as a matter of pride even if the resulting economic benefits wou ld not balance the costs.
paying visitors a day -far more than go there now . What could be more cost-beneficial? Yet Congress, in response to ethica l and political arguments, outlawed this profitable scheme.
Interior Secretary Watt has now promised to give concess ionaries a greater role in managing our national parks. These entrepreneurs know how to market a park-to turn unprofitable w ild erness areas into money-making golf courses, motels, bars, discos, swimming pools, restaurants, gift shops, and condominiums. These are things that we want and are willing to pay for as consumers-no matter what we might think of them a s citizens. A free market ca ll s for these things; they sell; consumer benefits outweigh con s umer costs.
The problem, as many people point out, is that although markets reveal our consumer interests, they may fail to measure ou r countervailing ethical or Do our consumer preferences measure our aethefic principles?
The Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970 requires that the exposure of workers to toxic substa nces be set at standards as low as are "feasible ." In two recent cases-one involving benzene and the other cotton dust -the Supreme Court has heard industry argue that exposure s t a ndard s are "feas ible" or "reaso nable" only if th ey a re cost-beneficial. Critics of this view say that if it were adopted workers wou ld be maintained as machines are-to the extent that is profitable. Workers would then not be treated as ends-in-themselves, but as m ere means for the production of overall socia l profit or utility.
The same debate arises with respect to the protection of wildlife and the preservation of wilderness environments. In 1969, for example, the Forest Service approved a plan by Walt Disney Enterprises to develop a vast resort complex in the middle of Sequioa National Park. This would have attracted 14,000 10 Courlesy U.S. Ell virol1mwla/ Agen cy aesthetic principles and our convictions and concerns as citizens. Markets exist for bowls of porridge but not for birthrig hts . Must we, then, ac t only as consumers, to turn every arcadia into an arcade and all our free natural beauty into money-making commercial blight?
Economists respond to thi s question in two ways. Some r ecognize that cost-benefit analysis simply cannot be used to settle ethical or political controversie s. Others are developing a " new" economics to create surrogate or imaginary markets to "price" ethical values and political co nvic tio ns.
Economists of the first so r t a llo w that Americans are not just consume rs with inte rests they want satisfied in m arketsj these economists recognize that we are also citizens who have opinions legislatures are supposed to represent . These economists concede, therefore, that pollution, health, and safety standards s hou ld be de term in ed throug h po liti ca l argu me nt a nd co m prom ise. Econo m ic fadors are import ant, of course; th ey may not be decisive but th ey should be take n into acco unt. T hese economists conte nd , moreove r, tha t th e r egul a tory agencies s ho uld do th e w ill of the legis latu re at th e least social cos t.
Econo mi sts o f the second kind be li eve that cos tbe ne fi t analysis can take the values, ar gume nts, and con vic ti o ns o f c itize ns into accoun t . Th ese econo m is ts som e tim es tr y to es timate moral and e thi ca l va lu es o n th e bas is of market data, for exa m ple, by looking a t pri ces pa id for prope rty in the range of a protected species. T he prim ary technique, h owever, is to ask c itize ns how mu ch th ey are w illing to pay for the sa ti s fac tio n of kn owin g that th e govern ment has ac ted cons is te ntl y wi th some principle, fo r exa mple, to prese rve w ild e rn ess. Even if citi zens wo uld pay o nl y a few doll ars each fo r these mo ral "sa ti s fac ti o ns," th e aggregate s um m ig ht be very s ubsta n tial.
Thi s approac h to cos t-ben efit an alysis-w hic h rega rds th e idea ls and as piration s of citizens as "ex te rna liti es" con s um e r marke ts have fail ed to "price"-res ts o n th ree mi stakes. First, it all ows econ o mis ts to ju s ti fy v irtuall y an y po li cy at all or it s opposite, fo r it is easy to find "frag il e" va lu es, "i ntang ibl es," and "mo rali sms," to s uppo rt alm ost an y pos iti o n.
Thi s amb iti o us approach to co s t-be ne fit analys is res ts a lso o n w ha t philosoph er s ca ll a categor ymis take. Th is is a mis take one makes in desc ribing an obj ect in te rm s tha t do not appropriate ly apply to it, as w he n o ne says th at the square ro ot o f two is blue. It is How Fair
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As the Reagan administration budget is deba ted in Cong ress and the media, much of th e discuss io n concern s th e re lati onship between w e lfare and employment. Th e pres ident s upport s optional workfare prog rams, in which individual s tates are pe rmitted to require food stamp recipients to "work off" th e va lue of food s ta mps received . AFDC (Aid to Fa milies w ith Depende nt C hildre n) recipients are alread y requ ired unde r th e WI N (Work Ince nt ive) prog ra m to registe r fo r and accept training and employ me nt as a cond ition of eligi bility (i f not needed at home fo r th e ca re of a yo ung child ). Such r equire ments h ave gene rated heated arg um ents for both their expan sion and e lim ina tion , o n bo th moral and pragmatic g ro unds.
Arguments for Work Requirements
A fir s t arg ume nt for work require me nts, which may implicitl y unde rlie many other arguments, is that R eport fro m the Ce nter f01" ~&-( no nsense to tes t th e worth of an idea l o r a principle by as kin g w ha t peo ple a re willing to pay fo r it. As well tr y to establis h the t r u th of a theore m by as kin g w hat it is worth, in eco no m ic te rms, to math emati cia ns . N obod y as ks econo m is ts how much t hey are w illing to pay fo r their view that cost-ben efit a nalysis should form the basis of reg ulator y policy. No, the views of economis ts are s upposed to be judged on the merits no t priced at the margin . Wh y s ho uldn 't thi s co urtes y ex tend to contrary o pini on s as we ll?
Third , cos t-bene fi t an alys is, in sofar as it "price s" ou r con victions as citi zen s alo ng w ith o ur interests as co ns ume rs, confuses the econo mic w ith th e political process. Political decis io ns have to be cos t-consciou s; th ey need to take econo mi c facto rs into account. But th is does no t reduce th em to econo mic decisio ns . To th in k o therwise w ould be to s uggest th at economic "experts" sho uld take the place of elected re presen tatives as interpreters of th e pu blic interes t. Th is w ould replace de mocracy w ith a ki nd of technocracy. It wo uld deprive us of o ur mos t che ri s hed po litical ri g hts.
Confl ict in o u r soci e ty invo lves ideolog ical contradi ction as we ll as econom ic com pe titio n . Th e one ca nnot be unde rs too d in ter ms of or redu ced to the o ther . Cost-benefit anal ys is may be used to g ive us information about valu es fo r w hich mark e ts e xis t and are appropriate . But thi s use is limited. We must oth erw ise rel y o n poli tical arg um ent and co mpromi se in Cong ress end ing in a vo te and no t resort to cos tbene fit anal ys is te rmin atin g in a bo tt o m lin e.
-Ma rk Sagoff
Workfare? a welfare recipient owes some thin g to society in e xchange for a gu arantee o f s ubsistence. On this v iew, food stamps, hou sin g assistance, and th e like are pri vileges ex tend ed by th e tax pay ing public to the indig ent, and it is o nl y fair th at th ose co nfe rring a priv ileg e should be able to se t condi tions governing its re ceip t.
A second clu ste r of a rg uments appeals to the ma ny be nefit s to be o btained thro ug h a system of work requirements:
(1 ) Betrefits fa other, more 1Ieedy recipients. If we assum e th at the welfa re budge t is re la ti vely fi xed, a g reater number of recipie nts mea ns a s mall er s hare for each . If the welfa re pie is s liced thin eno ugh , th e needies t reCipients may be threa tened w ith in adequate benefit s. If able recipie nts are required to work in the regular labor market, th e ir wag es free w elfare funds to aid their needier fellows . (The crealion of public
